.png)
Iranian regime espionage in the West increasingly active
tt Iranian regime escalates its espionage in the world is a fact. This article seeks to shed light on this prevailing threat and to identify some of the destructive activities and advocacy operations of the Iranian Inhuman Regime.
Bahareh Letnes and former Minister of Fisheries Per Sandberg,
This is despite the fact that Norway's Minister of Justice accuses the Iranian regime of exporting terrorism abroad and does not want to issue visas to mullahs that the regime sends to sponsor terrorism and acts of violence in Norway. Formally, Per Sandberg resigned because he had his office telephone with him, which is a violation of the rules for ministers in Norway. But there are also suspicions that the girlfriend, who became Miss Iran in 2013, is a spy for the Islamic regime. Read more…
In 2013, a group of nine Iranian prostitute women were arrested in Turkey accused of spying for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The women had received critical information and documents from Turkish military officials, police and government officials. Read more…
Iran uses mosques and cultural centers as a platform for intelligence and surveillance.
Norwegian state television NRK reported in November last year that the country's security police PST will deport an Iranian "imam" due to fundamental national interests. Read more…
Iran uses its agents to conduct covert surveillance of Israeli and Jewish facilities in the United States and to gather information about Americans who supported the Iranian opposition, NCRI, who want to overthrow the current Iranian regime.
In August 2018, the United States prosecuted two Iranian agents. Ahmadreza Doostdar, 38, a U.S.-Iranian dual citizen born in Long Beach, California, and Majid Ghorbani, 59, who has lived and worked in Costa Mesa, California since arriving in the United States in the mid-1990s, were accused of acting as illegal agents of Tehran. Ghorbani, who denies the allegations, had received a permanent residence permit in the United States in 2015. read more…
Norwegian citizen in Denmark guilty of spying for Iran
In June 2020, a Danish court sentenced a Norwegian citizen to seven years in prison. He was convicted of spying for the Iranian regime's intelligence service and participating in a suspicious plan to kill an Iranian-Arab opposition leader in Denmark.
Mohammad Davoudzadeh Loloei, a 40-year-old Norwegian with Iranian credentials, was arrested in October 2018 after a major police operation in which Denmark temporarily closed its international borders. Read more…
In Sweden
In the early 1990s, a Kurdish refugee, Karim Mohammedzadeh, was killed in Nynäshamn. Säpo suggested that an Iranian intelligence agent could be the culprit. But the murder is still unsolved. The murdered man had previously been part of the Kurdish guerrillas in Iran and was imprisoned in the country before he came to Sweden as a refugee. Read more…
In September 1990, a 54-year-old home language teacher, Efat Ghazi, was murdered in Västerås by a letter bomb. The letter bomb was addressed to the woman's husband Amir Ghazi, who was still politically active. Both the police and EFT's relatives were convinced that the Iranian regime was the culprit. Read more…Niac does not represent me, he represents the terrorists
In 1993, an Iranian-Swedish man, Jamshid Abedi Lahrodi, was charged with espionage against sympathizers of the Iranian opposition, the Iranian National Resistance Council (NCRI), in Stockholm on behalf of the regime. In connection with his prosecution, it also emerged that he had planned to carry out a bomb attack on NCRI's office in Stockholm. He was sentenced to one year in prison. He currently works at the Iranian embassy in Stockholm. Sweden expelled three Iranian diplomats.
In 2019, a 45-year-old Swedish citizen was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for spying on Iranian dissidents. The unnamed man with an Iraqi background spied on opposition Iranians in Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, among other places, with the aim of passing the information on to the regime in Iran. Read more…
IN THE U.S
Last week, the United States indicted an Iranian political science writer living in the country for acting as a secret agent for the Iranian regime. Kaveh Afrasiabi is an Iranian citizen but has a permanent residence permit in the United States. He worked at Boston University and other American universities.
He lobbied US officials, members of Congress, published books and articles to promote Iran's positions while secretly employed by the Iranian regime's UN mission. He also worked with journalists such as "Iran expert" and often commented on current Iran issues in articles and interviews for American media. Read more…
In Belgium
An Iranian diplomat and three of his accomplices were tried in Belgium in December 2020 for terrorism. They were accused of planning a bomb attack on an international conference in support of a free and democratic Iran in Paris on June 30, 2018, organized by NCRI. The verdict is expected in February as new evidence has emerged.
Nasimeh Naami was arrested in Belgium on June 30, 2018 while transporting the bomb to Villepinte.
In connection with the trial, it was revealed that the accused diplomat, Assadolah Assadi, who was active at the regime's embassy in Vienna, is in fact one of the regime's intelligence officers. It was also revealed that Assadi had used his diplomatic immunity to take the bomb from Iran to Austria on a commercial flight.
Assadi had recruited the accomplices (a Belgian couple and a man, all of Iranian descent) for several years. The diplomat paid the hundreds of thousands of euros to spy on and gather information about NCRI's sympathizers for several years and to carry out the bombing, according to evidence presented during the trial. Read more…
We Warn
Iran's espionage and intelligence activities abroad are real. The targets are not only exiled Iranians but also foreign nationals. It requires a common response from all authorities and EU Member States.
Many Afghan asylum seekers in Sweden and other countries have, according to their statements, fallen victim to the Iranian regime's coercive measures intended to send them to the war in Syria. In many cases, this is their reason for seeking asylum in Sweden. The wave of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iran unfortunately follows Iranian, Syrian and Arab spies who are supported by the Iranian regime among the asylum seekers to Sweden. Read more…
The Iranian regime exercises influence in Sweden through several mosques and centers for Islamic fundamentalism. Some specific examples include the Imam Ali Mosque in Stockholm and the Balal Mosque in Gothenburg. Read more…
The Riksdag and the government must sharpen their naive view of Iran and abandon their passive attitude towards the regime, as also the Security Police Chief Klas Friberg pointed out in a statement on 11 January.
“Sweden must become better at meeting the threat by giving higher priority to security at the strategic political level, with our authorities and in the business community. We must put in place a unified national effort and, not least, security protection must be improved.
Foreign power exploits shortcomings in Swedish security protection
2021-01-11
Foreign powers are increasingly using cyber espionage to gather information and conduct security-threatening activities in Sweden. The security police assess that the method will become increasingly important in the future. At the same time, there are shortcomings in security protection.
- The threat picture against Sweden is broader and more complex than before. Attacks and activities by foreign powers are directed at fundamental freedoms and rights, our economic prosperity, our political decision-making and our territorial sovereignty. It is attacks that are going on here and now and that affect our democracy, says security police chief Klas Friberg. iranian terrorist loby in usa
Niac is a terrorist group that supports the Iranian terrorist regime in principle those who work with niac are Iranian real agents in the United States
Digitization and technological development have contributed to the development of foreign powers' capabilities in areas such as cyber espionage. The knowledge and information that is mapped and stolen from Swedish companies and in world-leading research and innovations in Sweden can be valued at billions every year.
At the same time, the number of blackouts is likely to be high. As the safety protection work is not prioritized to a sufficiently high degree, there is often a lack of ability to both prevent and detect intrusion from a qualified actor.
Cyber espionage is also about stealing information of importance to Sweden's security, trying to influence Swedish decision - making in an illegal way or conducting other security-threatening activities.
- The security police assess that cyber espionage will become increasingly important in the future for foreign powers, both in terms of information gathering and destructive attacks, says Klas Friberg.
About 15 countries today conduct various forms of espionage and other security-threatening activities against Sweden. Russia, China and Iran are the biggest threats. The regimes in these states aim, in addition to creating stability for their own regime, to strengthen their country's status as an economic, political and military power. Russia, China and Iran also conduct intelligence activities that pose a threat to the lives and health of individuals.
- Foreign power uses the resources of all its societies in a structured and systematic way, coordinates various means and acts both on its own and through agents to achieve its goals. Sweden today is not well enough equipped to meet this threat, says Klas Friberg.
The increased power and activity of foreign powers in combination with the shortcomings that exist in security protection work means, among other things, that jobs and knowledge disappear from Sweden, our political decision-making is affected and Sweden's territorial sovereignty is challenged. In addition, Sweden's total defense capability risks being exposed as it builds up.
- Sweden must become better at meeting the threat by giving higher priority to security at the strategic political level, with our authorities and in the business community. We must put in place an overall national effort and not least, security protection must be improved, says Klas Friberg.
The second mercenary is Reza Beheshtipour, who is the brother of Hassan Beheshtipour, who is a member of the IRGC intelligence and lives in Germany
Germany is conducting extensive investigations to track down Iranian intelligence activity on its soil, revealed documents retrieved from ongoing probes.
Spy activity connected to Tehran is being traced through ledgers collected from a former Iranian diplomat’s car.
Asadollah Asadi had worked as a diplomat at the Iranian embassy in Vienna until he was arrested in Bavaria in 2018 for involvement in plotting the attempted bombing of an assembly organized by the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI) outside Paris.
German authorities had handed him over to Belgium, where his trial is currently taking place in the port city of Antwerp alongside the trial of a Belgian-Iranian couple who were arrested for attempting to stage the attack.
When Asadi was arrested on July 1, 2018, the German police discovered many documents, including a black ledger in his car, with coded dots, which seem to be instructions on making bombs, a report by German TV’s Channel One said.
Instructions found in the black ledger are believed to have been intended for the arrested couple, whose verdict is expected to be announced this February.
The Channel One report said that the couple received hundreds of thousands of euros in the past several years for their cooperation with the Iranian secret service.
Among other documents discovered in Asadi’s belongings is a green checkered ledger with 200 pages, with receipts that show the diplomat has distributed cash among some individuals in different European countries.
The green ledger has 289 Latin and Persian notes, which mention tourist attractions, stores, hotels, and restaurants, with times and dates. These spots are believed to have been visited by Asadi.
German agents have figured out that this information involves around 11 countries including France, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy, but there are also 144 notes about locations in Germany.
One note points to the entrance of the Hamburg Islamic Center, which is under German internal security surveillance. According to German intelligence, the center is used by the Iranian regime to “export revolution” and is known for supporting Lebanese militias.
When interrogated by German authorities, Asadi defended himself by saying that he was merely a tourist and that the sites found in the green ledger are for touristic spots he used to visit accompanied by his children.
Asadi, however, had been carrying several receipts that indicate suspicious cash payments. The recipients who have signed the receipts all have very common Iranian names and their identities are still unknown.
Some have received payments between 2,500-5,000 euros. Another individual has confirmed receiving a laptop. German police speculate that the payments are for espionage.
Sources at the NCRI have confirmed reported findings to Asharq Al-Awsat.
“The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence has a network of agents in Europe that are managed with the help of Iranian embassies, and the misuse of diplomatic capabilities,”Javad Dabiran, a spokesman for the Iranian opposition group, told Asharq Al-Awsat
“Asadi is the head of Iranian intelligence in Europe and used to run a network of spies,” Dabiran confirmed, adding that three agents linked to the ex-diplomat now face trial in Belgium.
“At least 40% of Asadi's meetings with his network of agents were held in Germany,” he noted.
Dabiran warned that there are various Iranian terrorist sleeper cells and spy rings across Europe and that they are handled by Iranian embassies.
هیچ نظری موجود نیست:
ارسال یک نظر